

2. DURING A COURTESY INTRODUCTORY CALL, MAY 20, ON DR. ASSADULLAH AMIN, THE NEW SECOND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, I RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE DRA'S LACK OF RESPONSE TO OUR REQUESTS TO EXAMINE THE WEAPONS OF THE TERRORISTS AND FOR CERTAIN BALLISTIC EVIDENCE. AS I EXPECTED, HE WAS NOT HELPFUL.

3. I TOLD AMIN OF OUR NEED FOR THIS DATA, WHICH WE HAD CONVEYED IN THREE DIPLOMATIC NOTES, THE LAST OF WHICH I HAD PERSONALLY DELIVERED TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER SHAH MOHAMMAD DOST ON APRIL 17. I POINTED OUT THAT NONE OF THESE REQUESTS HAD PRODUCED RESULTS.

4. AMIN'S RESPONSE INDICATED HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON THIS ISSUE, FOR HE REPLIED THAT DOST WAS ON RECORD AS HAVING

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TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

OFFERED US EMBASSY OFFICERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW THE WEAPONS ON THE NIGHT OF THE KILLING, FEBRUARY 14. A/DCM FLATIN AND I TOLD AMIN THAT THIS WAS NOT QUITE TRUE. ALTHOUGH SUCH AN OFFER HAD INDEED BEEN CONVEYED TO US BY TELEPHONE THAT EVENING, OUR EMBASSY OFFICERS WERE IN FACT DENIED ACCESS TO THE WEAPONS THAT NIGHT WHEN WE TRIED TO SEE THEM AND WERE ADVISED TO APPLY THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY INSTEAD. WHEN WE SUBSEQUENTLY DID SO, NOTHING HAS HAPPENED. AMIN STUBBORNLY RETORTED THAT SINCE DOST HAD STATED IN HIS OFFICIAL REPORT THAT THE OFFER HAD BEEN MADE TO THE AMERICAN, IT WAS OUR FAULT WE HAD NOT TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF IT. THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, AMIN SAID REGARDED THE MATTER AS CLOSED.

5. IN EXASPERATION I ASKED MIN, "WHY DO YOU PROHIBIT US FROM BEING ABLE TO INSPECT THESE WEAPONS? WHAT ARE YOU TRYING TO HIDE?" AMIN AGAIN INSISTED THAT DOST HAD EARLIER OFFERED TO MAKE THE WEAPONS AVAILABLE AND WE HAD FAILED TO FOLLOW-UP ON THAT OFFER. I RETORTED AGAIN THAT THAT WAS NOT TRUE, AND REPEATED OUR REQUEST FOR TEST-FIRED BULLETS FROM THE WEAPONS INVOLVED. I TOLD HIM I FOUND IT INEXPLICABLE WHY THEY WERE NOT COOPERATING.

6. AT ONE POINT DURING ALL THIS EXCHANGE, AMIN SAID HE DIDN'T THINK THE WEAPONS WOULD IN ANY CASE BE AVAILABLE, SINCE SO MANY MONTHS HAD ELAPSED AFTER THE CRIME. I EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THIS, OBSERVING THAT PRESIDENT TARAKI HIMSELF HAD RECENTLY STATED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO PURSUE THE DUBS INVESTIGATION, "EVEN IF IT TOOK 20 YEARS" (SEE KABUL 3434). AMIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TARAKI HAD SAID THAT, BUT ADDED THAT EXAMINING THE WEAPONS WAS NOT NECESSARY TO SUCH AN INVESTIGATION.

7. ASSADULLAH AMIN FINALLY AGREED TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER FURTHER WITH SHAH MOHAMMAD DOST. I SUGGESTED THAT HE ALSO DISCUSS IT WITH HIS UNCLE AND FATHER-IN-LAW, HAFIZULLAH AMIN. ASSADULLAH AMIN DEMURRED, SAYING HE THOUGHT THE MATTER HAD FIRST TO GO TO DOST.

8. COMMENT: I FOUND AMIN'S RESPONSES VERY DISCOURAGING. IT TENDS TO LEND CREDENCE TO RUMORS THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT IS ENGAGED IN SOME TYPE OF COVER-UP. YET LOGICALLY THAT DOESN'T MAKE MUCH SENSE. I AM AFRAID MY

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Trial	Control (n=10)	MCI (n=10)	AD (n=10)
1	95	85	75
2	95	85	75
3	95	80	70
4	95	75	65
5	95	75	65

... THE SPEAKER GOVERNMENT, ...

1. The first step is to identify the problem. This involves understanding the symptoms and the context in which they are occurring. It is important to gather as much information as possible about the problem, including any relevant history and current circumstances.

2. Once the problem has been identified, the next step is to develop a plan of action. This involves determining the goals of the intervention and the steps that need to be taken to achieve those goals. It is important to consider the resources available and the potential barriers to success.

3. The third step is to implement the plan. This involves putting the plan into action and monitoring the progress of the intervention. It is important to be flexible and responsive to any changes that may arise during the process.

4. The final step is to evaluate the results of the intervention. This involves assessing the extent to which the goals have been achieved and the impact of the intervention on the individual or system. It is important to document the results and share them with others who may be interested in the same problem.

[illegible][illegible]

2000 年 12 月 10 日

[illegible]

MY OWN FEELING: I AM VERY DISCOURAGING. I AM APPRAISING MY  
COUNTRYMEN TO BE OF THE SAME TYPE OF COVER-UP. YET  
I BELIEVE THAT COULDN'T HAVE BEEN OTHER. I AM APPRAISING MY

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## TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

MEETING ONLY CONFIRMED MY FEARS THAT WE WILL NOT RECEIVE A SATISFACTORY REPLY, IF WE GET ANY AT ALL, TO OUR REQUEST FOR BALLISTIC EVIDENCE.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-19-2010 BY 60322 UCBAW/MEL/STP TO OUR RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT DIVISION.

NOTE ON DATA COLLECTION: COORDINATES WITH 8/8-8, AR. 8788A.

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